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Elbadawi and Majd compare economic perfor-  those in countries elsewhere in Sub-Saharan
mance in the CFA (franc) zone with the eco-  Africa and similar low-income developing
nomic performance in similar countries outside  countries. They control for initial conditions,
the CFA zone in recent years.  changing exogenous intemal and world environ-
ment, and policy stance.
The results of their model estimates indicate
that the competitive position for CFA members  Their approach allows for a formal testing of
was weaker in the second half of the 1980s than  whether zone membership is a random choice.
in the first half and weaker than in non-CFA  The implication of randomness (that there is no
countries - in terms of output growtl  1s  well as  selection bias) is that the CFA-zone economies
the performance of exports, investment, and  would have performed the same as the rest of
savings. The exception was domestic inflation:  Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, if there had
the CFA fared better on that front.  been no zone. Their results show the assumption
of randomness to be valid only for GDP growth
Results for a longer-term comparison (of the  and inflation. For other indicators (the ratios of
1970s and the 1980s) are somewhat mixed. The  savings, investment, and exports to GDP), the
CPA zone performed better than the others in  decision to participate in the zone is assumed to
exports, domestic savings and investment, and  be endogenous and is related to the expectation
inflation - but failed in the long run to distin-  of improved economic performance. Therefore,
guish itself in terms of economic growth.  in estimating the zone's  effects on those three
indicators, Elbadawi and Majd corrected for the
Elbadawi and Majd use a modified-control-  ensuing "sample selectivity" bias by estimating
group approach to compare changes in macro-  the status indicator (participation versus
economic indicators in the CFA countries with  nonparticipation) with a probit model.
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Thio  paper  is a product  of CECMG's  RPO  on macroeconomic  adjustment  and
economic  performance  in the CFA  zone.  The  paper  has  benefitted  from  initial
discussions  and  very  helpful  and  detailed  comments  by Lawrence  Hinkle  (AF1DR).
These  comments  have  been  taken  into  considerations  in subsequent  revisions  of
the  paper.  We  are  also  grateful  to Gary  Hyde  and  Shantayanan  Devarajan  for
their  comments  on  the  earlier  draft  of  the  paper.I: INTRODUCTION
"The thirtee-n  sub-Saharan African  countries of  the  franc  zone have
conventionally been associated with economic stability attributed to a fixed
exchange rate with France and guaranteed convertibility of their currency, the
CFA Franc.  But the franc zone economies have experienced economic declines in
recent years and most countries have  had to adopt economic austerity programmes.
Farmers have protested against lowered crop purchase prices while public sector
workers have been antagonized by wage cuts and freezes.  Most of the thirteen
countries enter the 1990s both politically and economically unstable."'
Such  a gloomy frejassessment  of conditions in  the  CFA franc  zone  reflects
a widely  shared concern  in the academic and policy debates over the  severe
economic  decline  in the  zone during  the second  half of the  1980s, and the
apparent  difficulties  at  arresting, much  less reversing,  the decline,  {see
Devarajan and  de Melo (1990)}. These conclusions are in sharp contrast with the
earlier results which attributed ths long-run growth of output and investment
(especially foreign) in the CFA franc zone to the monetary stability and low
inflation imparted by the  fixity of the exchange rate  (CFA 50  - FF 1), the
built-in  restraints  on  expansive  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  and  the
convertibility  of  the  CFA  franc,  e.g.,  Mundell  (1972),  Guillaumont  and
Guillaumont  (1984), Devarajan and de Melo  (1987), and Suillaumonts and Plane
(1988), among others.
The sharp reversals of the zone over the last two decades is a tale of
economic interdependence, in a changing world economic environment, and a story
of how devastating accumulated economic mismanagement can be.  During the 1960s
and 1970s, the CFA Franc was pegged to a relatively weak currency  (the French
Franc) which was depreciated, and  frequently  devalued, vis-a-vis the US dollar
for most of the period.  The depreciation of the FF during the 1970s  appeared to
have  successfully  counterbalanced  the worsening  of the  CFA terms  of trade,
especially  after  1973,  which  helped  maintain  real  stability  of  the  zone
(Elbadawi, (1991)).2 Hence, the atmosphere of currency convertibility, relative
I Overseas  Development  Institute  Briefing  Paper,  July 1990.
'  For the role of real exchange  ate  stability  in stemming  uncertainty  and  enhancing  investment  and  growth,  especially  for expotsu,  see
Caballero  and  Corbo  (1989).  and  Faini  and  de  Melo  (1990).2
monetary discipline, anc!  the  exogenous depreciation of  the FF fostered  stability
and averted serious overvaluation.  These factors have been credited with the
steady  and positive economic performance of the zone  (especially during the
turbulent period of the late 19709).
As early as the second half of the 1980s, the CFA franc zone started to
show signs of economic difficulties as the accumulated effects of laxity in the
implementation  of  the  zone  fiscal/monetary  regime  began  to  materialize,
especially for the bigger countries  .
3 The problems of the zone, however, did
not assume crisis proportions until after 1985  when the FF started  to appreciate
vis-a-vis the US dollar in the face of deteriorating terms of trade for the CFA
zone.  This period also witnessed the onset of considerable real lepreciation  in
several sub-Saharan African countries (including  xey  export-competitors of the
zone in West Africa).  This acted like an added adverse exogenous shock to the
economies of the zone.
4 With nominal devaluation not available as an instrument
of  policy, adjustment by deflating the economy has so far proven to be elow,
costly, and politically difficult.
The controversy over the choice between maintaining a fixed  parity cum an
automatic fiscal/monetary discipline with convertibility as in the CFA zone and
adhvitng to more flexible exchange rate regimes justifies a closer look at the
econc  :  consequences of  each regime during both  tranquil and turbulent periods,
which also reflects other changing conditions such as the new role of France as
a  member  in  the  European  Monetary  System.  This  paper  analyzes  economic
performance  of  the  CFA  zone  relative  to  other  comparators  using  a
modified-control-group approach  (see  Corbo and Rojas  (1990), Heckman and Hotz
(1989)  and references cited therein).
'The  larger  economics  of the  zone  such  as  Cote  d'lvoire,  Senegal,  and  Cameroon  which  dominate  the  proces  of credit  distribution
tended  to have  the  most  inflationary  monetary  policies  and  hence  the  most  appreciated  exchange  rate.
' Although,  the  small  country  assumption  tells  us  that  these  developments  should  not  be  consequential.3
The modified-control-aroup approach is superior to other methods such as
the before-and-after and the control-group approaches, because in assessing the
marginal contribution of  the  effect of interest (in  our case participation in  the
CFA zone) it controls for the impact of initial conditions as well as changing
exogenous world environment and policy stance.
The paper will compare performance of the CFA members with a sample of
other  sub-Scharan African  countries  (SSA) and  a  set  of  similar  low-income
developing countries, including  other SSA, which for  simplicity we will label  as
(LZDC).  Initially, we test for the two  equally plausible assumptions concerning
the  zone  membership  decision.  The  first  is  based  on  the  notion  that
participation  decision  in  the  zone  is  a  random  choice  (see,  for example,
Devarajan and de Melo (1990)).  The rational for the first assumption is that
given the  similar historical, cultural,  and  economic  background of the  CFA  member
countries to those of LIDC, and other SSA countries in  particular; it is likaly
that in  the absence of the  CFA arrangement, the  economic performance of the  three
groups of countries could have been more or less analogous to each other.
And the second assumption is  held by those who view the zone  participation
decision as  a nonrandom choice,  endogenous  to the  economic  performance and policy
stance.  On the basis of this assumption, it is likely that the chances for
continued participation in  the zone will be enhanced by expectation of improved
economic performance brought about by currency convertibility and monetary and
exchange  rate  stability or  the  possibility  for debt  forgiveness and  other
favorable arrangements  with France.$ In  general,  the close  historical, cultural,
and economic ties that bond France with the CFA members tend to set them apart
'  The  CFA  zone  is made  up of two separate  unions:  the  West  African  Monetary  Union  (UMOA)  and  the  countries  which  have  formed
the  Bank  of Central  African  States  (BEAC). The  former  includes  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Cote  d'lvoire, Mali, Niger,  Senegal,  and  Togo  and
the  latter  consists  of Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad.  Congo,  Equatorial  Guinea,  and  Gabon.  The  union  mnembership  has  gone
through  a series  of changes  i;  the  past  twenty  years  as  countries  exercised  some  freedom  to  join or to leave  the  two central  banks  (Honohan,
1989).  For  example,  Guinea  abandoned  the  French  franc  on independence.  Mauritania  joined  UMOA  and  left in 1973  and  Madagascar
Mayed  with the  French  Franc  until 1973,  but  never  joined  either  of the  two unions.  Mali left the  zone  after independence,  only  to rejoin  it
in 1967,  and  to become  a member  of the  UMOA  in 1984.  Togo  was  not  a founder  member  of UMOA  but  joined  after  the  change  of
government  in 1963.  In 1985  Equatorial  Guinea  became  both  the  smallest  member  of the  CFA zone  and  the  first member  not  to have  been
a former  French  colony.4
from the res' of sub-Saharan Africa.  In that case, to assume that the CFA
members  are  selected  randomly  is  untenable.  Failure  to  account  for  this
"selectivity bias" will  lead  to biased and inconsistent statistical results.  In
fact, these unique  features put the CFA  members  in a distinguished position
vis-a-vis the rest of other developing countries.  The likelihood of abandoning
zone  participation  will increase if  these features are shown  to impede  growth  and
adjustment.
Given the difficulty involved in determining a  priori  whether or not zone
participation decision were random,  we have decided to formally  run the Hausman
(1978)- type  specification test  for  "selectivity bias"  for each  indicator
Depending on the results of this test we were, then, able ta decide whether to
represent  membership effect  by an  actual  or instrumented  dummy, in  the subsequent
modified-control-group equation.
In  the  present  paper,  we  allow  also  for the  fact that  economic
performance of the West African Monetary Union  %UMOA)  may have been different
from that of the countries of the Bank of  the Central African States (BEAC), as
policies  differed  in the  two unions  during  the  period  under  consideration
(Elbadawi (1991)).6
Section  II of the paper will be devoted to a detailed analysis of the
economic conditions - in terms of economic performance and policy stance - that
prevailed during the period 1970-89.  The analysis is  made  on the  basis of simple
weighted averages.  An analysis of the averages, we acknowledge, neglects the
essence  and magnitude  of the  internal and  external  shocks that  eroded  the
economic prospects of our sample countries during much of the 1980s.  Therefore,
in Section III, we present a model for estimating marginal contribution of the
CFA zone effect, while controlling for initial  conditions and changing exogenous
non-membership  factors.  In addition, we consider explicitly policy reaction
'  This distinction. however,  will  not be made  in the modified-control-group  analysis.5
functions and  correct foz tho "sample  selectivity"  bias that may result from the
non-randomness of the zone membership.
After  making an  assessment  of  the validity  of  the  maintained identification
conditions concerning the membership decision, in Section IV we estimate the
marginal contribution of the CFA zone on the economic performance of the sample
countries  and  use  the  results  to  reassess  costs  and  benefits  of  the  zone
participation.  The decision on  possible parity changes as  a complement to
monetary and fiscal discipline - which have, for a long time, been a saliLnt
feature of the zone - will be examined in Part V.6
II.  AN  OVERVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  PERFORALNCE  IN  THE  CPA  Z0NE
In this section we comparte  the evolution of the performance indicators
for the CFA zone with two groups: other SSA countries and LIDC.  Except  for
Gabon,  the  rest  of  the CFA  members  fall  into  the  categories  of  low  - to
lower-middle-income  countries.  The  per  capita  GNP of  these  countries was
estimated below S1500 in 1982.  Using this figure as an uppar bound, we selected
the two groups.  As for the group of comparators, it is obvious that the group
of  other  SSA  countries  is  the  most  relevant  group  for  assessing  economic
performance in the CFA zone,  given its similarity to the CFA members in  terms of
socio-economic structure, initial  conditions, and exogenous world environment. 7
MII-.1  Lona-Run  Comparison:  1982-89 Versus  1973-81: Table  1 presents
averages of the  selected performance  indicators  for the  CFA zone  and other
comparators during the two sub-periods 1973-81 and 1982-89.  It shows that the
output growth rate slowed much faster in the CFA zone compared to that of LIDC
while the gap between the CFA members and the neighboring SSA countries narrowed
drastical.j in recent years.  The declining trcnd was steeper for the BEAC than
UMOA as the output growth rate in the latter dwindled by more than 6 percent
between the two periods, from  an average of over 8 percent per annum in  the 1970s
to 2 percent in the 1980Os.
The erosion of competitiveness in the zone is  more pronounced in terms of
sagging export performance.  As can be seen from Table 1, the upward  trend of the
export growth reversed for  the zone in recent years as the average annual growth
rate of exports fell from 7  percent in  the 1970s  to a negative  0.4 percent in  the
1980s.  While the poor performance of the zone  may be attributed to the serious
'  See  Annex (1) for the complete  listing of the countries  in each  group.
a  Note that BEAC is dominated  by oil producing countries  which are subject  to wider cyclical fluctuations  of expots and output.  For
insnce,  the index of average  crude  price in the world market  (1985=100) has fluctuated  widely between  1986  and the first quarter of
1991:  the index declined  to 51.2 in 1986, increased  to 65.9 in 1987,  again  declined  to 52.5 in 1988, rose  to 63.7 in 1989, rose  again  to
81.7 in 1990, and declined  to 68.2 in the first quarter of  1991.drought  conditions of  1982-84 and  in more recent years to deterioration  of
commodity export prices in some UMOA countries, 'he loss of competitiveness is
quite blatant, as both the other SSA countries and LIDC were abld to regibter
positi-e export growth rates in the 1980s, respectively by 2.5 percent and 8.9
percent.
It has been argued that output growth in SSA was sluggish despite high
investment,  particularly through  heavy  borrowing from  abroad. This is  attr")uted
to tha low level of capacity utilization as opposed to capacity growth, driven
by investment (Ndulu, 1990).9  Table 1 shows that the countries outside SSA in
general  fared better  in terms of  output growth rates  for a given  level of
investment.  During the 1980s the share of investment dropped on the average to
about 21 percent of GDP per year in the CFA zone and the average annual output
growth rate was 1.6 percent.  Similarly, the investment ratio declined to 15.7
percent of the GDP in the SSA and the GDP growth rate was 1.3 percent.  In the
same period, the LIDC was able to increase output by more than 6 percent per
annum for an investment share to GDP of around 27 percent.  This is equivalent,
on the average, to a GDP growth rate of 0.08 percent for every dollar invested
out of income  in the SSA countries, including  the CFA zone, as compared  with 0.23
percent in  the LIDC which implies  a lower  efficiency of investment in  sub-Saharan
Africa relative to that of other parts of the world.
It is difficult to mobilize domestic resources when per capita income is
falling.  Between  the 1970s and 1980s, the CFA GDP growth  rate declined by
approximately three times.  The impact  on savings  was more severe for the  UMOA,
as the average annual share of domestic savings to GDP dropped from over 16
percent  in the 1970s to about of 12 percent in the 1980s.  The corresponding
decline in such shares for the SSA was from more than 20 percent per year to
about an annual average of 12 percent in the two periods  As a result, all
'  This is because  of the  compression of imports required  to addrcss  balance  of payments difficulties, and imported intermediate  goods
are imperfect substitutes  for domestically  produced  goods in most  of the  cconomies  of SSA,8
African countries had to resort to more external borrowing which resulted tn
aubsequent debt overhang in  the 1980s.  The percentage ohares of the debt to  GOP
increased, on the average, to almost 72  percent for the CFA members, to about 58
percent per year for other SSA, as compared wJIh around 29 percent for the LIDC.
Only BEAC was able to increase domestic savings, partly because of an increase
in the petroleum profit tax and hence relatively less reliance on the external
borrc  ng.
We have already  seen the  deterioration of  the economic situation  of the  CFA
members  as  reflected  by  the  lower  output  and  export  growth  rates,  lower
investment and savings ratios to GDP, and higher debt to GDP ratio as compared
with the S3A  and LIDC.  To what extent  were the  policy instruments adopted  by the
CFA governments responsible for the worsening of the zone economies?  In this
part we will focus on the fiscal and  monetary instruments and the-. implications
for  the  governrrnt  budget  deficit  and  inflation  as  well  as  other  policy
indicators for the zone in comparison to those of comparators.
Table 2 depicts chenges in the resource balance as a percentage of GDP,
domestic credit exparsion,  government deficit, inflation, and  the real effective
exchange rate for the two sample  periods.  The table shows an improvement  of the
resource balance for the zone in the 1980s  as compared  with the other two groups
of countries, particularly with BEAC being able to register a positive resource
balance relative to GDP by  more than 3  percent.  With exports declining in  recent
years, improvement in resource balance for the CFA zone reflects the fact that
imports had to be drastically curtailed.  As we have argued above, this may have
adversely  affected  output  growth  rates  in the  1980s,  by  reducing  capacity
ut-lization.
One important aspect of zone  membership has been adoption of tha stringent
rules of fiscal and monetary disciplines which tended to enhance credibility by
providing a buffer for resisting pressures on increased monetary financing of9
fiscal deficits.  Table 2 shows that these  rules, while being effective  in
inhibiting the rate of domestic credit expansion, have become less pinching in
recent years because of (a)  the unrestricted  access to cradit for  crop financing
which was no longer self-liquidating  due to  the fall in commodity prices and the
subsequent attendant losses of the marketing boards, ther-by undermining the
central bank credit controls,  (b) the cumbersome decision-making process for
setting  the  interest  rate  and  using  it  as  an  effective  monetary  policy
instrument, and (c)  a  declini in the quality  of the commercial banks' loans  when
business conditions deteriorated as a result of repeated droughts which were
subsequently compounded by deficiencies in  bank management, the nonobservance  of
normal  banking  procedures,  and  the  extension  of  credits  without  proper
collateral.
Notwithstanding the  increasing  demand  pressure for  central  bank refinancing
of the commercial banks' meager portfolios and the pressing need for monetary
financing of the government deficit, the two central barks appear to have opted
for  their  commitment  to  financial  stability  at  the  expense  of  their
responsibilities aa lenders of last resorts.  As a result, the monetary rules
have been geared to policies enabling the t'zo  central banks to protect their
external reserve  positions over  the longer-term. Consequently, in  the 1980s,  the
annual credit expansion declined to 7.6 percent from about 27 percent in the
1970s.  Meanwhils, the same rates for  the SSA and LIDC increased  respectively by
24 percent and about 38 percent in the 1980s.
While the rules of  monetary policy were successful in  curbing the consumer
price inflation, the commitment to fiscal discipline has not been equally strong
in the CFA zone, leading to a one percent increase in the government deficit to
GDP ra-io between the 1970s and the 1980s.  Given the absence of seigniorage
revenue available to the fiscal autnorities as well as the presence of inertia
for capital spending together with the inability  to reduce current expenditures,
the governments of the CFA zone were forced to resort to external financing and10
to exceptional financing such as successive debt reschedulings and accumulation
of payment arrears on both domestic and foreign debts.
On the contrary, member countries of the CFA zone,  as  was expected, have
managed to maintain relatively low  rate of increases  in domestic prices than the
other two groups of comparators in  ti.e  past two decades.  The median of the zone
annual inflation rate declined from more than 12 percent in the 19708 to around
4 percent in  the 19805 whereas inflation in  the group of SSA countries was above
17  percent and that  of LIDC was above 12  percent per annum during the years 1982-
89.
What caused the fiscal  expansion to have little impact  on inflation in  the
CFA zone?  Honohan (1990b)  uses a principal component analysis to determine the
zone's success in achieving low rate of consumer price inflation.  His results
show that there is a slow but reliable convergence of consumer price inflation
in the  CFA to  French  inflation.  Also,  he maintains  that a  stable nominal
exchange rate appears to have resulted in low inflation for the CFA members.
Furthermore, Honohan asserts that the openness of the CFA economies prevents
strong linxages between fiscal financing through credit  expansions and monetary
growth.  If there  is too  much  credit  expansion,  he argues,  it will  simply  leak
out into imports or capital movements within the zone and the "core" member,
France.  If there is  too little, it will be made up by capital inflows.  One may
deduce that the fiscal expansion has little impact on the stock of money, and
hence inflation.
A recent study by the IMF shows  that, in  fact, inflation rates for  the zone
members have moved in line with the rate of inflation in France, albeit within
BEAC grouping the rates being generally slightly lower  than in France.  However,
the zone's  largest countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon encountered
difficulties in  matching the improvement in inflation performance from the mid-
1980s onward.  There seems to  be a  general consensus as to the success of the CFA11
members in containing inflation  by a variety of policy  measures, most notably  by
curbing aggregate demand in  the process of correcting external imbalances  which
served to exert downward pressure on domestic prices.
In comparison  to the non-CFA sample countries, zone  economies have enjoyed
a relatively more stable real effective exchange rate (REER) since 1970.  From
Table 2, it is clear that variations in the REER were much slower for the zone
members than  the groups of comparators during the  laot two decades. On the
contrary, the SSA groupings pursued more rigorous adjustment policies in the
1980s, including deep devaluations - not easily detectable in the CFA zone -
which  ere reflected  in a much  higher REER index.  During this period, the
average annual REER index increased  by more than 10  percent for the group of SSA
countries  from  about  97  in  the  1970s to  107  in the  1980s  (implying  real
depreciation) whereas the index  declined  to 92.4 in  the CFA zone  from 93.4 in  the
1970s; all calculated at the 1980 base year.  Over the same period, the REER
index dropped by more than 3 percent for the group of LIDC.  To a large extent,
the devaluation of nominal exchange rates by the SSA countries outside the CFA
zone appears to have been an appropriate response to correct and reverse the
earlier dramatic overvaluations experienced by many of these countries (e.g.,
Ghana, The Gambia, Nigeria, Zaire), especially during the period 1973-83.
The flexibility  of the nominal  exchange rate as  opposed to  the fixed parity
raises  the  issue  of  competitiveness,  in  general,  and  nominal  versus  real
stability, in  particular, which has been discussed elsewhere (see, for example,
de Macedo (1984),  Devarajan and  de Melo (1987),  Guillaumont and  Plane (1988),  and
Honohan (1990b)) and, therefore, will not be explored here.  Suffice to mention
that the issue seems to be unresolved in the literature since  other factors such
as  macroeconomic  environment,  realization  of  efficiency  gains,  downward
flexibilities of nominal prices and factor costs, and  exogenous shocks - just  to12
name  a  few  - appear  to  play  crucial  roles  in  that  respect.10
During  the  1980s,  much  of  the  currency  devaluation  by  the  developing
countries  was  a  direct  response  to  the  adverse  external  environment  characterized
by  wide  swings  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  the  soaring  international  interest  rate.
Table  3  shows  the  magnitude  of  external  and  internal  shocks  for  the  three  groups
of  countries.  The  comparison  is  made  for  the  three  periods:  1982-85  versus
1973-81,  1986-89  with  respect  to  1982-85,  and  1982-89  versus  1973-81.  In  the
first  period,  the  combined  terms  of  trade  and  interest  rate  shock  was  much  more
severe  for  UMOA  than  any  other  group  while  the  SSA countries  experienced  the
hardest  blow  in  terms  of  internal  shock  (narrowly  def  ined  and  proxied  by  the
index  of  food  production,  see  notes  to  Table  3).  At  the  same  time,  LIDC  was
adversely  affected  by  a  rapid  terms  of  trade  deterioration  and  high  interest
payments  on  external  debt.  The  magnitude  of  the  total  external  shock  for  this
group  was  calculated  as  -3.4  percent,  close  to  that  for  other  SSA at  -3.3,  while
CFA  sustained  a  small  -0.8  aggregate  external  shock.
In  the  second  period,  the  terms  of  trade  situation  worsened  for  the  BEAC
countries  primarily  due  to  the  stagnating  global  petroleum  market  and  falling  oil
prices  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s.  As  a  result,  the  CFA countries  were  hard
hit  by  the  external  shock,  despite  a  less  severe  interest  rate  shock."
Period  3  compares  the  long-term  evolution  of  the  shock  indicators.  An
analysis  of  this  period  shows  that  the  impact  of  the  total  external  shock  was
about  two  times  more  severe  for  UMOA  than  other  comparators.  It  shows  that
during  the  1980s  the  CFA countries  were  more  traumatized  by  the  worsening  global
environment  than  their  comparators.  Meanwhile,  the  impact  of  internal  shock  was
10  One example in that respect is Honohan  (1990b)  who asserts  that the  short-mn elasticity  of non-agricultural  expott supply  is
low and  agricultural  producer  prices are mostly  administered  and, therefore,  not directly affected  by devaluation.
"  Note that the calculation  of the real interest  rate shock  is based on actual debt servicing  which reflects  accumulation  of arrears in the
late 1980s  by many  of the developing  countries.13
Table  1:  A Long-Term  Comparson  of Pcrtbnnancc  Indicators
(GDP Weighted,  1970s  and  1980s)  /1/, 12/
Average  Average  %Increase  (+)
1973-81  1982-89  Decrease(-)
(1)  (2)  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(2)  - (1)
Average  Annual  Real  GDP  Growth  Rate  (Percent)
CFA (I1)  5.7  1.6  4.1
UMOA  (7)  4.0  1.4  2.6
BEAC  (4)  8.2  2.0  -6.2
Others
SSA  (18)  2.8  1.3  .1.5
LIDC  (25)  5.5  6.2  0.7
Average  Annual  Growth  Rate  of Real  Exports  (percent)
CFA  7.0  -0.4  .7.4
UMOA  5.1  -0.0  -.  I
BEAC  9.9  -1.0  -10.9
Others
SSA  1.2  2.5  1.3
LIDC  7.6  8.9  1.3
Investment/GDP  Ratio  (Constant  Prices)
CFA  28.5  21.4  -7.1
UMOA  25.5  16.3  -9.0
BEAC  33.0  29.1  -3.9
Others
SSA  28.0  15.7  -12.3
LTDC  25.7  27.1  1.4
Domestic  Savings/GDP  Ratio  (Constant  Prices)
CFA  23.0  20.5  -2.5
UMOA  16.5  11.6  -4.9
BEAC  32.9  34.1  1.2
Other
SSA  20.9  11.7  -9.2
LIDC  17.9  15.2  -2.7
External  Debt/GDP  Ratio  (Current  Prices)  /a/
CFA  35.9  (9.9)  71.9  (24.2)  36.0  (14.3)
UMOA  35.6  (10.3)  92.0  (27.6)  56.4  (17.3)
BEAC  36.2  (9.5)  51.8  (20.9)  15.6  (11.4)
Others
SSA  15.0  (11.4)  58.3  (29.7)  43.3  (18.3)
LIDC  16.3  (21.1)  28.9  (33.9)  12.6  (12.8)
Sources:  Andrex  database,  CECMG,  and  CECTP,  World  Bank
Notes:  (1) Number  of countries  in parenthesis  (2) Missing  data  for some  countries  for some  years.  /a/ Debt  aervice
ratios  in parenthesis.14
Table 2: A LONG-TERM  COMPARISON  OF POLICY  INDICATORS
(GDP  Weighted, 1970s  and 1980s) 111,  /2/
Average  Avcraga  % Increase  (+)
1973-81  1982-89  Decrease  (-)
(1)  (2)  (2) - (1)
ResaDurce  Balance  as Percentage  of GDP (Percent)
CFA (11)  -4.2  1.0  3.2
UMOA  (7)  -6.6  -3.7  2.9
BEAC  (4)  -0.4  3.1  3.5
Others
SSA (18)  0.2  *1.3  - 1.5
LIDC (25)  -1.7  -2.1  -0.4
Domestic  Credit Expansion  (percent)
CFA  26.7  7.6  -19.1
UMOA  28.4  3.4  -25.0
BEAC  25.1  11 8  -12.7
Others
SSA  11.5  24.0  35,5
LIDC  31.0  37.7  6.7
Government  Deficit  GDP Ratio (Percent)
CFA  5.2  6.2  1.0
UMOA  8.0  7.1  -0.9
BEAC  2.4  5.4  4.0
Others
SSA  5.5  6.9  1.4
LIDC  3.2  4.5  - 1.3
Median  of Annual  Inflation  (Percent)
CFA  11.6  4.1  -7.5
UMOA  11.1  3.8  -7.3
BEAC  11.7  5.7  -6.0
Others
SSA  14.0  17.3  3.3
LIDC  13.5  12.3  -1.2
Real Effective  Exchange  Rate (1980=100)/a/
CFA  93.4( 8.5)  92.4( 7.7)  -1.1(-0.8)
UMOA  94.8( 8.2)  88.5( 8.8)  -6.6( 0.6)
BEAC  92.1(8.8)  96.3(6.6)  4.6(-2.2)
Others
SSA  96.8(15.7)  107.0(28.9)  10.5(13.2)
LIDC  108.4(11.3)  104.8(17.8)  .3.3(6.5)
Sources:  Andrex  database,  CECMG, and  CECTP, World Bank  and IFS database
Notes: (1) Number  of countries  in parenthesis,  (2) Missing  data for some  countries  for some  years.
/a/ Variability  of REER in Parenthesis.15
Table 3:  External  and Internal  Shocks ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________-------__------------
1982-S6 with  respoect to  1973-81  1988-89  with  respect  to  1982-85  1982-89  With  Resp et  to  1973-81
Terms  Real  Total  Internal  Terms  Real  Total  Internal  Terms  Real  Total  Internal of  Interost  External  Shock  of  Interost  External  Shock  of  Intorest  External  Shock Trade  Rate  Shock  Trade  Rate  Shock  Trade  Rate  Shock
CFA (11)  1.8  -2.7  -0.6  -4.6  -5.9  0.3  -5.6  0.5  -2.7  -2.6  -5.3  -4.3 UMOA  (7)  -3.4  -2.6  -6.0  -2.0  -2.6  -0.0  -2.6  4.6  -3.8  -2.7  -6.6  -0.1 BEAC (4)  7.0  -2.7  4.3  -7.2  -9.3  0.6  -89.  -3.6  -1.6  -2.6  -4.1  -8.6 Others
SSA  (18)  -2.0  -1.3  -3.3  -7.7  0.6  -0.4  0.2  -1.1  -1.9  -1.5  -3.4  -8.2 LIDC  (26)  -1.7  -1.7  -3.4  1.9  -0.7  0.2  -0.6  1.8  -2.1  -1.6  -3.7  2.7 Soureo: World Bank, Andrex database.
Note:  The total  *ffect.  of  the  external  shock  as percentage  of  CDP  is  the  sun of  the  terms of  trade  and the  real  interest  rate  effects.  The interost rate  effect  In  calculated  *w  -(r-rbaso)*(debt/GDP)beg,  wher-  r  Is  the  real  interest  rate  computed  as  (i-dp/p)/(14dp/p);  rbase is  the  average real interest  rate  of  periods  1973-81  and 1982486;  1 Is  the  ratio  of  tho  public  and private  interest  payments  to  total  debt;  and dp/p  is  the  'world Inflation*  prosled  by  the  change  In  the  US  CNP  deflator,  and  the  (debt/GDP)b.g  is  tho  ratio  of  debt  to  GDP  of  tho  year preceding  the  beginning  of  tho nd  period.
The  teorm  of trade  effect  Is calculated  as ((Px/Pxbxce)-1]  (X/GDP)beg-((Pm/Pmbase)-1].(M/GDP)bog,  where  Px *nd  Pm are the  avorage  oxport  and import  Nric indices  deflated  by the  US CDP  deflator,  respectively;  Pxbase  and  Pmbase  ore  the  average  price  indices  of the  baso  period;  X and  M are exports  of GNFS and imports  of  GNFS,  and (X/COP)beg and  (U/GOP)bog are the  ratios  of  X and M to  GOP respectively  at  tho  yoer  preceding  tho  beginning  of the  and  period. The  internal  shock  io  proxied  by  the  percentage  change  in  the  index  of per  capita  domestic  food  production  in  1980  prices,  ca'culated  as C(food(t)/food(t-1))-1)elOO,  where  t  is  the  period  average. Way 22,  199116
the highest for the SSA countries as the index  of per capita food production for
this group  was more than 8  percent lower In  the 1980s  as  compared with the 1970s.
(11.21  A Closer Look at 1980s: 1986-89 Versus 1982-85
The weakening competitive position of the CFA zone was aggravated in the
second half of the 1980s.  Moreover, a comparison of the two sub-periods 1 and
2 in Table 3 has shown that each group of countries was subject to external and
internal  shocks of varying degrees.  For example,  in 1982-85, the  CFA zone
suffered less  than their counterparts in  terms of the external shock but less so
in terms of internal shock when compared to the SSA  group.  On the contrary, the
magnitude of the external shock was much more severe for the former group than
the SSA countries  during 1986-89.  The  non-homogeneity of  the 1980s  decade  would,
therefore, justify  a close scrutiny of  the situation.  For that reason,  we divide
the period 1982-89 into two sub-periods: 1982-85 and 1986-89.  The results are
summarized in Tables 4 and 5.  In the second half of the 1980s, the group
of comparators responded to external shocks  by adjusting their economies through
a series of macroeconomic adjustment programs, most notably by aligning their
nominal exchange rates.  Consequently, in these countries the output and exports
grew more rapidly and the resource balance situation improved faster than those
of the CFA members.  In addition, by bringing down the fiscal deficits, the
groups of comparators were able to improve their domestic savings situation.
During the 1980s, sub-Saharan African countries, including the CFA zone,
borrowed heavily from abroad.  The ratios of debt to GDP  for these countries
increased respectively by more than 16 percent and 51 percent for the CFA and
other SSA between the two periods  1982-85 and 1986-89.  The accumulation of
external debt which accompanied a substantial worsening of the terms of trade
resulted in increased debt servicing for the CFA and non-CPA countries of sub-
Saharan Africa in the late 1980s.  In that respect, UMOA was the most highly
indebted sub-group with an average debt to GDP ratio of 94 percent and a debt17
service ratio of about 42 percent.
Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP plunged at a slower pace
for the group of comparators than that of the CFA zone as a whole, albeit with
UMOA being an exception  in thar regard.  Moreover, the comparators achieved
considerable real depreciation, particularly SSA countries which depreciated by
more than 61 percent between the two periods.  It should be noted that while the
performance of UMOA was still sluggish over the second half of the 1980s, the
dismal performance of  the CFA zone  during the  period was more attributable  to the
gloomy economic situation of the BEAC oil producing economies as well as the
larger countries of UMOA such as Cote d'Ivoire.
Similar to the decade of the 1970s, the rate of domestic inflation in the
CFA  zone remained  low,  at about  1 percent per  year  during the  late  1980s,
relative  to  the  high  inflation  rates  experienced  by  the  two  groups  of
comparators.  The control over the rate of domestic credit expansion by the CFA
two central banks appears to have played a major role for such a low rate of
inflation. However, the zone's fiscal  efforts  were not successful, as  the ratios
of the government deficit to GDP remained relatively high, around 8 percent per
year during the period 1986-89, in comparison to the similar ratios for the SSA
and LIDC, being respectively about 7 percent and 5 percent.
To recapitulate: the sluggish performance of the CFA countries during the
1980s and the erosion in the zone's competitiveness, have been the subject of
much debate in recent years.  Opponents of the fixed parity see the issue in
terms of an inappropriately valued currency that impedes growth and adjustment.
According  to this  group, during  the  late  1980s the persistently  overvalued
exchange  rate  resulted  in a  drastic  curtailment  of  public  expenditure  and
particularly investment in  the CFA zone (Devarajan  and de Melo, 1990).  A change
in the fixed parity, they argue, would be the most efficient way of restoring
competitiveness.18
The  proponents  of  the  fixed  parity,  on  the  other  hand,  state  that
participation in the zone fosters growth because the fixed exchange rate - as a
nominal anchor - together with guaranteed convertibility of the CFA Franc would
lead  to an stable investment  climate for investors,  while adherence  to the rules
of  fiscal  and monetary  discipline  reduces the  need  for  adjustment  through
currency devaluation.  They argue that a devaluation can be risky because to
correct imbalances a series of devaluations may be required.  This will fuel
inflationary expectations and capital flight, which will in turn contribute to
a new real appreciation of the currency anc vo t likely a reversal of the policy
(Guillaumont and Guillaumont,  1989).  In that case, devaluation will become
ineffective in terms of having an impact on growth and competitiveness.
In  a  recent  study  of  the  causes,  consequences,  and  cures  of  rising
inflation in four prototypal groups of African countries with varying exchange
rate, capital account,  and price control  regimes,  Chhibber (1991)  states  that the
key  to price stability lies  in  avoiding  profligate public spending.  In  addition,
an effectively separated monetary and fiscal policy by joining a monetary union
such as the CFA franc zone, he maintains, is another way of lowering inflation.
However, he warns against the rigidity of a fixed, pegged exchange rate regime
in hampering growth and concludes that an open capital account framework  with a
flexible exchange  rate - a  la Indonesia-provides the  best example of price
stability without jeopardizing growth.
In brief, the group of comparators were able to adjust their economies to
the adverse external environment by launching a series of corrective exchange
rate, fiscal, and  monetary policies.  The CFA members, on the other hand, diI not
move quickly to restore their competitive edge, despite the fact that the terms
of trade and  the interest rate shocks  were more severe in the CFA zone than their
counterparts in the period 1986-89.
In any case,  with the apparent failure  of the CFA  to fare  well with respect19
to other comparators - at least over the second half of the 1980s in terms of
growth and competitiveness - and with  the increasing difficulty of external
finance and mounting debt and financial crises, in add.tion to the decline of
investment and savings, the need to restore compe:itiveness by the CFA zone has
become more pressing today than anytime  before.  Whether or not  this will require
an alignment of currency depends on the role - if any - that participation in
the zone has in the economic decline of the CFA member countries.  This issue
will be considered in the following two sections.20
Table  4:  A  SHORT-TERM  COMPARISON  OF  PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS
(GDP  Weighted,  1982-85  and  1986-89)  /1/,  /2/
. ......  ...........  ..  ..  ..  ...  ...........  . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Average  Average  %  Increase  (+)
1982-85  1986-89  Decrease  (-)
(1)  (2)  (2)  - (1)
....  .....  ...  ....  ................................  . . ..  . ..  . . . . . . . . ..  . . ..  . . .
Average  Annual  Real  GDP  Growth  Rate  (P  rcent)
CFA  (11)  2.9  0.4  -2.5
UMOA  (7)  1.1  1.7  0.6
BEAC  (4)  5.6  -1.7  -7.3
Others
SSA  (18)  -0.2  2.8  3.0
LIDC (25)  6.4  5.9  -0.5
Average  Annual  Growth  Rate  of  Real  Exports  (percent)
CFA  3.4  -4.4  -7.8
UMOA  0.0  -0.01  0.0
BEAC  8.6  -11.0  -19.6
Others
SSA  0.6  4.4  3.8
LIDC  5.6  12.3  6.7
Investment/GDP  Ratio  (Constant  Prices)
CFA  24.7  17.7  -7.0
UMOA  17.9  14.6  -3.3
BEAC  35.1  22.4  -12.7
Others
SSA  17.7  13.7  -4.0
LIDC  26.7  27.3  0.6
Domestic  Savings/GDP  Ratio  (Constant  Prices)
CFA  25.6  14.4  -0.2
UMOA  11.7  11.4  -0.3
BEAC  46.9  18.9  -28.0
Others
SSA  10.9  12.4  1.5
LIDC  24.0  25.0  1.0
External  Debt/GDP  Ratio  (Current  Prices)  /a/
CFA  64.7  (20.6)  81.1  (27.8)  16.4  (7.2)
UMOA  90.1  (33.3)  94.0  (41.6)  3.9  (8.3)
BEAC  41.8  (17.2)  61.8  (26.2)  20.0  (9.0)
Others
SSA  32.8  (26.6)  84.0  (35.1)  51.2  (8.5)
LIDC  25.3  (23.0)  32.4  (27.6)  7.1  (4.6)
....  ....... _  .................................  ........................  ..............
Sources:  Andrex  database,  CECMG,  and  CECTP,  World  Bank
Notes:  (1)  Number  of  countries  in  parenthesis,  (2)  Missing  data  for  some
countries  for  some  years.  /a/  Debt  service  ratios  in  parenthesis.21
Table  5: A SHORT-TERM  COMPARISON  OF POLICY  INDICATORS
(GDP  Weighted,  1970s  and 1980s)  /1/,  /2/
,............  ............................................................  ......................................................  ......
Average  Average  % Increase  t+)
1982-85  1986-89  Decrease  t-)
t1)  (2)  (2)  - t1)
,.............................................................................
Resource  Balance  as Percentage  of GOP (Percent)
CFA (11)  0.8  -2.7  -3.5
UMOA (7)  -4.6  -2.7  1.9
BEAC (4)  9.0  -2.7  -11.7
Others
SSA (18)  -2.3  -0.2  2.1
LIOC  (25)  -2.4  -1.8  0.6
DOmestic  Credit  Expansion  (percent)
CFA  12.6  2.5  -10.1
UMOA  6.6  0.2  -6.4
BEAC  18.7  4.9  -13.8
Others
SSA  27.1  20.8  -6.3
LIDC  27.1  28.6  1.5
Government  Deficit  GOP  Ratio  (Percent)
CFA  4.9  7.7  2.8
UMOA  7.4  6.6  -0.8
BEAC  2.5  8.7  6.2
Others
SSA  7.3  6.6  -0.7
LIDC  4.3  5.0  0.7  -
Median  of Annual  Inflation  (Percent)
CFA  9.9  1.2  -8.7
UMOA  5.7  0.8  -4.9
BEAC  10.1  1.3  -8.8
Others
SSA  15.6  16.6  1.0
LIDC  10.7  12.1  1.4
Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate  (1980=100)  /a/
CFA  86.4(  3.7) 98.3(  5.2)  13.8(40.5)
UMOA  81.0l  4.6)  92.3(  4.9)  14.0(  6.5)
BEAC  91.8(  2.9)  104.3(  '.5)  13.6(89.7)
Others
SSA  141.1(25.6)  54.5(37.5)  -61.4(46.5)
LIDC  95.1(10.3) 80.4(10.8)  -15.5(  4.9)
.....................................................................  ...
Sources:  Andrex  database,  CECMG,  and  CECTP,  World  Bank  and IFS  database
Notes:  (1)  Number  of countries  in  parenthesis,  (2)  Missing  data  for some
countries  for  some  years.
/a/  Variability  of REER  in Parenthesis.22
IIT.  Analysis  of Country  Performance:  Modified  Control-Group  Approach
The above analysis while being useful  in providing a view of the facts
regarding the differences in  economic performance and related exogenous factors
and policy stance between CFA and non-CFA member countries; it is not helpful,
however, in addressing the main question: can these differences,  if any, be
attributed to the marginal effects of membership in the zone?
An adequate framework for estimating the marginal contribution of the CFA
zone  effect  should  adjust  for  initial  conditions,  changing  exogenous  non-
participation  factors, in addition, the methodology must explicitly consider
policy  reactions  and  hence  the  endogeniety  of  policy  instruments.  More
importantly this miethodology  should allow  us for,  testing for and correction of,
the "sample selectivity" bias that could result from  the non-randomness of zone
membership,1 2 also  it  should  permit  an  assessment  of  the  validity  of  the
maintained identification  conditions  regarding  the  participation  decisions  needed
for idantifying membership effect.
The problem  of selectivity bias arises  in  evaluating the impact  of  economic
reform on average economic performance  (real growth, say), when the average
performance of the CFA countries would differ from that  of the non-CFA countries
even  in  the  absence  of  program.  Formally,  if  yie  stands  for  economic
performance of country i at period t in the absence of zone participation, and
if di  is an indicator variable equal to one if i is a CFA country and equal to
zero otherwise; then selectivity bias implies the following:
E(yXt  I  di  =  1)  *  E(yt,  I  di  =  0)
The above interpretation of the selection bias problem borrow' from the
"  As  we  mentioned  in the  introduction  to the  paper.  it is entirely  possible  that  in the  case  of CFA membership  such  methodology  we
develop  in this  paper  allows  us  to formally  test  for andogeniety  of membership  effect.2  3
literature  on the impact  of social  programs.'' The strand of the literature  that
exploits non-experimental data (as in  our case) has produced rather non-uniform
predictions regarding the effectiveness of social programs.  In a recent paper
analyzing the effectiveness of training programs, Heckman and Hotz (1989)  argue
that "evidence of striking differences in estimates produced from alternative
non-experimental  estimators  merely  confirms  the  existence  of  systemic  differences
between  trainees  and comparison  group members  in  characteristics  affecting
outcome measures", and the different non-experimental estimators make different
assumptions about the distribution of these differences.  Based on this Heckman
and Hotz  (1989) then go on to develop  a family of models that  resolve the
selection  bias  problem  under  varying  identification  conditions.  They  also
develop formal tests for  choosing among  alternative non-experimental estimators,
subject to data availability.
In  what follows  we will use the Heckman  and Hotz (1989)  paradigm  to develop
two types of estimators that permit identification of CFA participation effect
under two different sets of assumptions.  Our model also draws on Rojas and
Serven  (forthcoming) which  incorporates a  policy  reaction  function  in  the
standard selection bias problem studied in the social program literature.
We start by stating the basic specification for the macro economic tazget
variable in equation (1) below.
Yit=a  +  W,it 2 +c  3di +  eit  (1A)
where  X.i  is  a  K -element vector of  the macroeconomic policy instruments  that
would  be  observed  by  country  i  in  period  t  under  the  circumstances  of
non-membership posture, W,,  is an M-element random vector of the world variables
not related to the membership and relevant to country i and period t, d,  is a
dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the country is a CFA Zone member
"  For exampIc Hckman and Holz (1989)  and the htIkraturiL  ited t1,:rin24
and zero otherwise, the prime (') sign denotes the transoc.-e  of a vector, and  e,
is an  iid disturbance shock un-correlated across time and across ir,dividual
countries.
In equation (1),  the target variable y,,  is a function of (a)  the value of
the selected policy instruments that  would have occurred  assuming non-membership
(a  counterfactual),  XRc;  (b)  a change in selected world economic conditions,
Wi,;  (c) the total effects of zone membership, di;  and  (d) unobservable random
shocks.
The policy vector x  is  generated according to the following reaction
function:
Xt=  - yi,t-1  +  Wi  82  +  83di  I  eit  (2A)
and the following identity gives the counterfactuals:
-9it  = Xi.C-  + (AXi  c  83di)  (2B)
d
where  Y,  is the desired value of the matrix Y 1,  of the individual economic
indicators,  yict,;  and  ei,  are random effects as in (1)  above, following Rojas
and Serven (forthcoming), e,,  and  es  are allowed to have a non-zero correlation
for i = j and t =  s, but are assumed uncorrelated in all other cases.
This  reaction  function  reflects policy makers'  responses  to perceived
disequilibria  in  the  target  variables.  It shows  that  a  change  in policy
instruments between any two periods is a function of the difference between the
desired value of the target variable in the current period and its actual value25
in the  preceding  period--the  vector  of  the  coefficienr:  cf  responsiveness  to
target disequilibria is 6,--a  change in the  world economic environment, whether
or not a country is a CFA member reflecting the discipline imposed by the zone
on policy s.ance, and a disturbance term  etX.
Equation  (2B) is an identity to define the counterfactual,  X,t.  Note
that in the case of non-CFA countries  Xi:=  X  i  (because di  =  0).
d
Since  Y1t  is unobservable, we  assume that the desired target  levels
depend on last period policy stance and actual target levels, in addition to
current exogenous world environment; this allows us to combine (2A)  and (2B) to
write  an  expression  for  the  counterfactuals,  X1,,  in  the  following
unrestricted reduced form:
=  bo+  W'  I  +  X'i 1 l  b2 +  Y'  t  b3 +  e  (3)
The model  is completed by adding a framework describing the decision by
countries  to  participate  (or maintain  their membership)  in the  zone.  The
participation decision can  be specified in  terms of  an index function framework.
Let the index, IN,  be a function of both observed (Z,)--which  may include all of
the elements in Xi,  and unobserved ( pL  ) variables and write:
INi  =  f  (Zi)  +  (4)
where f(.) is an unspecified function  of Z,. Then the ih  country's participation
status is given by:
"  One potential limitation of this model is that the tea,tion  fun;tion .an he highlk unstable  and in the extreme  ease  deriving the
counterfactuals  becomes  insoluble  problem (e.g  Goldstein  and Nlontl.1 (l986t)26
d  1  if  and  only  if  INi  > 0
d  lo  otherwise  (5)
Now abstracting from (4) and (5) for a moment, we use (3) in (1)  to obtain the
following estimating equation for participation effect:
Yc  - YC-1=  Po  +  WMAI3  +XI,t- 1 2+Yi  t-1P3
+  P 4d  + (e 1,  +  f3 5e 1,)  (6)
The above  equation provides the structure  that  we will combine with  the two
sets of identification conditions in order to derive the two estimators of the
program effect.
A.  Non Selection-Bias
This estimator is obtained by adding to equation (6) the assumption that:
the conditional expectation of e,,-s  does not depend on di. That is assuming the
following condition holds:
E(eic I  di,  Xi1 -, W1) =  0  (7A)
For all t, for this model consistent estimates of the impact of  program can be
obtained by simply estimating equation (6) using OLS where di  is exogenous.
B.  The Modified-Control-Group Estimator
The first  assumption we make is  that the dependence between e,,  and d,  arises
because of the dependence between  [I  and e,,.  More formally27
E(eieIdi,  Xis  Wit)  *  0  and
E(eitldi,  Xc,  Wit,  Zi)  0  0  but
E(eie|di,  Xit,  Wit,  Zi) =  E(etlXi,, Wi.,  Zi)  (78)
This case  is  referred to  by  Heckman and  Hotz  (1989) as  "selection  on
observables"  .15
In  addition  to  condition  (78),  this  approach  requires  an  assumption  giving
specific  functional  specification  to the  participation  status  in  equation  (4).
.f(Z 1) =  Ziy
Pi  - iid  from  the  distribution F(Ai) =  Pr(p 1 < pi)
and  E(pi1Zi) =  0  (7C)
Now assumption  (7C)  allows  us to write:
Pr(di  =  Ilzi)  = E(di  Z 1) = 1  - F(-Z1 y)  (7C')
The probability  statement  (7C')  provides  a basis for  estimating  (via  a
probit model  _a"  Corbo  and  Rojas  (1991), for  example)" an  instrument
" Here  we  don't consider  the  'selection  on unobservables'  case  which  is not  very  relevant  to the  problem  at  hand.  See  H.ckncn  and
Hotz  for more  details  on this.
" See  alto Barrow t &I  (1981),  and  Heckman  (1979).28
ai =  1 - F(-Z1?)  for di. The second step is to estimate equation (6)  using
OLS with  8i (rdther  than di)  used as a regressor.
Note that in case (A) the identifice.tion  condition is much stronger than
that  of case (B),  but in  the former  case identification  of  marginal participation
effect is possible without the need to specify the decision rule.  On  the other
hand,  estimator (B)  requires  specific  functional  and  distributional specification
of the participation decision process, but  membership in  the Zone is  not assumed
to be random.  In the following section we will estimate both models.  In our
view, these  two estimators  should provide an  opportunity  for assessing  the
robustness of our results.  At any rate, we will formally test the validity of
each of assumptions (A)  and (B)  using a Hausman (1978) type specification test.29
IV.  Empirical Results
In this section,  we estimate the modified-control-group  of Section III  and
use  it  to  analyze  the  marginal  effect  of  zone  participation  in  economic
performance of the CFA relative  to (a)  other SSA and (b)  other SSA and LIDC.  The
comparison will be made for both the short-run (19869-86 versus 1982-85) and
long-run (1982-89 versus 1973-81).
The first issue we settle is the presence (or lack thereof) of selection
bias.  To decide which of identifications (A) and (B) is valid, we employ a
formal  Hausman  (1978)  type  specification  test  where  the  robust  White-
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors were used because of the cross-
section  nature  of  our  data  (see ANNEX  II  for  a  full  description  of  the
specification test).  With the exception of output growth and inflation,  we fail
to  accept the  null hypothesis of  (no selection bias)  for other performance
variables such  as  exports, investment,  and savings  at  any  reasonable significance
level.  This clearly shows that the question of randomness in participation
decision is  an  empirical issue and  cannot be assumed a  priori  as in  Devarajan and
de Melo (1990). Our approach  has furnished sufficient ground  to believe  that the
choice concerning zone membership is, at least partially, associated with an
expectation of improved economic performance.
Table 6  preuents the results of the probit Maximum-likelihood equation for
the participation status of the CFA countries.  The decision period is 1982-85
during which the movements in and out of the zone reached their highest point.
A  change  in the variable  pertains to variations  in the period  1982-85 with
respect to  1973-81.  Tne main  determinants of  zone participation  are: REER
variability,  the  ratio  of  exports  of  GNFS  to  GDP,  deficit  to  GDP  ratio,
inflation, terms of trade, change in debt outstanding and disbursed, change in
net capital flows,  internal and  external shocks,  and  a dummy variable  which takes
the  value of one if the country has a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL)  with the
World  Bank and zero otherwise.  All the coefficients have the appropriate signs30
and most are statistically significant." 7 For example, larger fiscal deficits,
higher foreign debt, or a more severe  external shock would encourage continued
zone participation.  Similarly, the  likelihood for zone participation to be
abandoned is  increased if  a  CFA country  experiences  higher inflation,  poor export
performance, higher variations of the exchange rate, a  deterioration of terms of
trade, a severe internal shock, or the possibility of having a SAL program.
In the second stage the fitted value of the dependent variable from the
maximum-likelihood probit equation  (a1)  is used as an instrument in target
equation (7) except for the cases of output growth and inflation for which no
evidence of selection bias was detected and the actual dummy (di)  was used.  The
estimation results showing the marginal effect of zone participation on the
macroeconomic  outcomes  are summarized in Table 7.  Tables  1-4 of Annex  III
provide the detailed individual regression results.  Thi comparison is  made for
the two periods: 1986-89 versus 1982-85 and 1982-89 with respect to 1973-81.
All variables are expressed in  constant 1980  prices to avert the deflating
problems,  particularly  for countries  with  high  inflation rates.  Moreover,
because of our small sample size, substantially insignificant effects in the
cross-section comparison between the  CFA zone  and  the SSA  and LIDC countries  have
been eliminated from the final regression results.
After controlling for the effects of external and internal shocks, fiscal
deficits, variability  of  the  REER and other  initial conditions,  and policy
variables; our regression results for the marginal effect of zone participation
on macroeconomic performance confirm the erosion of competitiveness of the CFA
members in comparison with the two groups of comparators in the short-run.  As
can be seen from Table 7, zone participation has cost the CFA countries a great
deal in terms of slow down in output growth as weli as their export, investment,
and saving situations.
"  Thc extenmal  shock  and thc expon  ratio,  however,  are  only  marginally  significant.31
Accordingly, the marginal effect of zone  participation on output has been
a  2.5  percent  decline  of  the  annual  average  GDP  growth  rate  for the  CFA
countries, between the two periods 1986-89 and 1982-85,  when compared with that
of other SSA.  Similarly,  when compared with LIDC, such an effect has been, once
again, mirrored in a lower GDP growth rate, by as much as 2.2 percent.
The declining trend of the zone's economic growth has recently been
aggravated  by  the  sluggish  export  performance  of  the  CFA  countries.  The
estimation results clearly show  that CFA members have lost  the competitive  upper
hand to the comparators, as the ratios of their exports to GDP were respectively
3.7 percent lower  when compared with SSA and about 7 percent lower  when compared
with SSA and LIDC.
A rather astonishing performance outcome of the zone in recent years has
been the worsening of the climate for domestic investment and savings, a long
time by-product of the zone's fiscal and monetary discipline as well as its low
and  manageable inflation.  From  Table 7, the direct effect of zone participation
has been a 6.3 percent decline  in gross domestic investment to GDP ratio as
compared  with  the  SSA  countries  and  a  2.7  percent  decline  vis-a-vis  LIDC
(although  marginally significant at  9% levels). The zone  membership had  the  most
severe and far-reaching implications for domestic savings of the CFA countries.
In the period 1986-89, the ratio of savings to GDP for the zone members were
around 6 percent lower than their counterparts when compared to the same ratio
in the early 1980s.
Nevertheless, zone participation helped  the CFA countries register a lower
inflation rates in recent years than the two groups of comparators, as these
rates were around 14 percent and 36 percent lower, respectively in comparison
with  SSA  and  LIDC,  albeit  the results  vis-a-vis  the  latter group  are only
marginally significant (at 15% level).32
Table 7 shows  also the  results  of the  marginal effect  of zone participation
for a longer term horizon.  When the 1980s are compared with the 1970s, the
estimation results clearly display the  zone's dominance over both groups of
comparators in terms of almost all the performance indicators.  In other words,
zone participation resulted in higher export, investment, and saving ratios to
GDP - respectively by about 10 percent, 7 percent, and 12 - relative to the SSA
competitors.  Moreover, it helped the CFA countries fare much better than LIDC
in terms of higher ratios of export, investment, and savings to GDP by about 4
percent, 3  percent, 3  percent, and 6  percent in  the 1980s,  respectively, although
the results for investment are marginally significant (at 17% level).  However,
the zone failed to distinguish itself from the LIDC group in terms of the GDP
growth rate while participation effect accounted for only 1 percent higher as
compared to other SSA in that regard.  These estimates, however, together with
those of tae marginal effects on inflation are only marginally significant.
The partial long-run improvement  of the zone  performance attributed  by the
model to the marginal effect of zone participation, may be due to the sharp
difference between  the  first and  second halves of  the 1980s decade and the
dominance of  the earlier in  the average  economic performance in  the zone  over the
1980.  decade.  On the one hand, the depreciated French Franc (FF)  vis-a-vis  the
US  dollar  during  the  early  1980s  helped  the  CFA  zone  maintain  its
competitiveness.  The zone  members, however, lost  momentum in  the second  half of
the 1980s with  the appreciation of the FF and the disproportionally harsher
external shocks they faced.  Furthermore, as early as 1984, other comparators,
especially  the  sub-Saharan  African  countries,  undertook  decisive  economic
reforms, including massive devaluations of their exchange rates.33
Table  7:  Modified  Control-Group  Estimates  of  the  CFA  Zone  Participation
,.  .....................................................................
A.  Short-Term  (1986-89  vs  1982-85)  CFA  w.r.t.  SSA  CFA  w.r.t  SSA
and LIDCs
..................................  ...............  .............
Change  in  GDP  Growth  Rate  -0.025  -0.022
(1.89)  (2.18)
Change  In  Exports  GNFS  as  X  of  GDP  -0.037  -0.070
(1.73)  (2.82)
Change  in  GDI  as  %  of  GDP  -0.063  -0.027
(1.76)  (1.69)
Change  in  GDS  as  %  of  GDP  0.069  -0.063
(2.36)  (3.09)
Change  in  InfLation  -0.142  -0.357
(3.11)  (1.43)
B.  Long-Term  (1982-89  vs  1973-81)
.................................
Change  in  GDP  Growth  Rate  0.010  -0.010
(1.33)  (0.88)
Change  in  Exports  GNFS  as  X  of  GDP  0.096  0.044
(2.25)  (1.81)
Change  in  GDI  as  % of  GDP  0.070  0.027
(2.i!)  (1.39)
Change  in  GDS  as  %  of  GDP  0.118  0.060
(2.97)  (2.04)
Change  in  Inflation  -0.082  -1.480
(1.31)  (1.76)
Source:  TabLes  I-IV  of  Annex  III.
Notes:  t-statistics  in  parenthesis;  GOI  = Gross  Domestic  Investment;  GDS  = Gross  Domestic
Savings;  w.r.t.  =  with  respect  to.
For  country  listing,  see  Annex  I.34
V.  CONCLUSION
The paper has shown  the  costs and benefits  of CFA zone  participation in  two
periods: 1980s versus 1970s and 1986-89 versus 1982-85.  During the second half
of the 1980s the comparative growth performance of the CFA members in the 1970u
eroded relative to the non-CFA countries.  The extent to which such a shortfall
was the direct results of zone participation and, hence the fixed parity of the
exchange rate, has  been broadly supported in  the present  paper, using a  modified-
control-group approach.
Since  - as our tests show - zone participation is basically a non-random
choice, we have corrected for  sample selectivity  bias by estimating the country
status  indicators  via  a  probit  model.  After  controllirng  for  the  initial
conditions, internal and external shocks, and the policy stance, the paper has
shown that the CFA members were outperformed over the short run by the groups of
comparators - other SSA, other SSA and LIDC - in terms of output growth as well
as  export, investment, and savings performance, except for inflation.
Also, we have provided a long-term comparison between the CFA zone anid  the
two groups of comparators.  The results of the modified-control-group approach
for the long-run are dramatically different from the former.  On the one hand,
zone participation helped the CFA members fare better than other SSA in terms of
all  the  performance  indicators,  albeit  with  only  marginally  significant
improvements for the cases of GDP growth and inflation.  More specifically, our
results show  that the zone's long-run  economic stability and  -hence  credibility -
has  been  instrumental  in  providing  a  favorable  climate  for  the  domestic
investment and savings  in comparison with other SSA countries.  On the other
hand, when compared with other SSA and LIDC combined, the marginal effect of the
zone  participation appears  to have resulted in  improved  performance of the  member
countries  in all respects except for GDP growth rate, for which the zone has
lagged behind the group of comparators.35
Tnese results cast  doubt on the  merits of  a zone-type  monetary union  during
a turbulent period such as the one experienced by the zone  members in the post-
1984 period.  Given the sunk costs involved in making changes to the nominal
exchange rate, the zone members adhered to the conventional rules of monetary
cooperation such as credit controls, budgetary disciplines, and the freedom of
capital movements to soften the adverse effects of the exogenous shocks.  These
rules, while offering some hope for low inflation, appeared not to have been
sufficiently  forthcoming  in  bringing  the  necessary  adjustment  to  the  CFA
economies  at  times  of  severe  exogenous  shocks  -especially  when  competing
neighboring SSA countries and LIDC have achieved considerable real depreciation
through changing their nominal exchange rates.
However, as  we discussed in Section (II.2)  of the present paper, the issue
of the short- versus long-run adjustment  in  the context  of zone  participation has
been very muWh the center of the debate in  recent years.  Our estimation results
may be seen as a  mid-way between the two polar cases in this  debate.  The results
confirm the notion that while the economies tied up to each other via monetary
unions may not be flexible enough to adjust sufficiently in the short run to
inclement  exogenous  shocks,  it  appears  that  the  built-in  mechanism  of  the
monetary and fiscal discipline may be suited to confer stability and improved
performance in the long run.
Nonetheless, if  the latter part of the l980s is conceived to be a  typical
turbulent period, then  the present paper has shown  clearly  that a prompt response
to unforeseen internal  and external shocks would become synonymous - for  the CFA
members - with adhering to a series of more flexible rules of absorption, let
alone alignment of the nominal currency.36
ANNEX  I:  LIST  OF  THE  SAMPLE  COUNTRIES
(A) UMOA:
Cote d'Ivoire,  Senegal





Central African Rep  Gabon
(C) CFA Zone;
[UMOA + BEAC]
(D)  Other SSA Countries:
Burundi  Ethiopia  Ghana
Kenya  Liberia  Madagascar
Malawi  Mauritania  Mauritius
Nigeria  Rwanda  Sierra Leone
Somalia  Sudan  Tanzania
Zaire  Zambia  Zimbabwe
(E) Low Income Developing Countries (LIDC):
Bangladesh  Bolivia  China
Colombia  Dominican Republic  Ecuador
Egypt AR  El Salvador  Guatemala
Haiti  Honduras  India
Indonesia  Jamaica  Myanamar
Morocco  Pakistan  Papua New Guinea
Paraguay  Pezu  Philippines
Sri Lanka  Thailand  Turkey
Yemen A.R.37
ANNEX II
HAUSMAN  "SELECTIVITY  BIAS"  TEST
A test for  selectivity bias is  presented  below.  It is  based on the  Housman
(1978) type specification test.  Assume the following linear relationship:
(A)  Y1 = XfP + d 1cz  + e
where the variables (d,)  is  possibly correlated  with e  while the XI  are not. Given
the matrix of instruments Z;  (which should include Xi),  let
ai  = Pz,di  = Zi (ZiZi)  'Zidj
and consider the following regression:
(B)  Y  =  Xfip  + dia  +  ay  +  V
Now a  test for Ho:  y  0  (a test for the null hypothesis  of no
covariation  between di and  e  in A)  is given by  the t-statistico  of the
coefficient  of the instrumented  variable af  in the regression  equation  (8),
where  the  t  test  is  based  on  the  White  heteroskedasticity  robust  standard  errors.
Accordingly,  the null hypothesis  of no selection  bias is rejected  if the t-
statistics  for  y  is statisticall,y  significant.
The results  of the  estimations  are  presented  in the Table  below.  These38
results allow us to reject the null hypothesis in all cases except for the GDP
growth rate and inflation.' 8 In other words, the estimation results confirm, at
least partially, the view that membership in the CFA  is  not random.
Hausman Specification Test for  Membership Decision
(CFA Zone Versus SSA and LIDCs)
------------------------------------------------------------------ __--
t-Statistics  Significance Level
(Percent)
GDP  -0.99  41
Exports/GDP  -4.00  8
GDI/GDP  -4.22  4
GDS/GDP  -5.63  5
Inflation  -0.93  35
_____y  _________________s_____ve_  --- on  -y  ---------- at------------------
"lThe  hypothesis  for exports,  however,  is  only rejected  at a relativcly  high  signiricance  levelsANNEX  III  Table  I  39
Table I: Modified Control-Group Estimates  of the CFA Zone Participation
(w.r.t.  SSA, 1986-89 Versus 1982-85)
..............................  ....................................................................  . ......
Dependent Variables
Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Ci dnge  in  Change
GDP  Growth  Exports as  GDI as %  GDS  as %  In In-
Rate  % of GDP  of GDP  of  GDP  flation
(dij  (drhatl  Id-hat)  (drhat)  (dj
................................................................................................................................  ....  .....  ._...
Regressors
Constant  4.7202  6.6521  8.9745  7.0411  33.5831
(0.9752)  (0.6989)  (2.7983)  (3.1736)  (1.1448)
GOP,.,  -0.7254  0.5319  ..  -0.2999  -1.4602
(-4.1628)  (1.3708)  ..  (-0.9341)  (-1.6524)
Exp/GDP,.,  -0.1042  0.0679  0.1423  0.2235
(-1.3319)  (0.6980)  (1.8457)  (1.6959)
GDI/GDP,.  0.0334  ..  -0.2806  ..  0.0839
(0.8245)  ..  (-2.9569)  ..  (0.3515)
GDS/GDP,,  ..  0.2908  -0.1898  -0.4540
(2.6461)  (-2.2705)  (-3.4941)
DF/GDP,.,  0.0505  0.5877  0.1144  0.3741
(0.3540)  (3.1077)  (0.4056)  (1.8508)
Inftation,,  0.0385  -0.0566  -0.0588  ..  0.6026
(1.5442)  (-0.8652)  (-0.9801)  ..  (4.2434)
VARRERt.,  0.1187  0.1792  . -0.0080
(1.8694)  (2.0498)  ..  (-0.3148)  .
RER,.,  -0.0128  0.0265  ..  ..  -0.2630
(-0.58191  (0.7466)  ..  ..  (-3.1637)
CHGDCr,*,  -0.1531  -0.1510  .
(-3.4477)  (-1.9593)
TOT,,,  0.0115  -0.0523  ..  ..  -0.1446
(0.2413)  (-0.5277)  ..  ..  (-0.4527)
ChgRes,.,  -0.0142  0.7799  -0.3418  0.5083  0.0318
(-0.1790)  (3.2743)  (-2.1941)  (2.9010)  (0.1834)
ChgDOO.,  0.0103  -0.0325  0.0655  0.0687
(0.6730)  (-1.0097)  (2.0667)  (2.4028)
Snt'l  Shock  0.0273  -0.3179  0.1223  0.0781
(0.2413)  (-2.6155)  (0.8719)  (0.7744)
Ext'l  Shock  0.2850  0.7327  ..  0.2487  -0.1821
(3.3038)  (2.9868)  ..  (1.3471)  (-0.4522)
Dummy  -0.0248  -0.0373  -0.0626  -0.0686  -0.1415
(1.8937)*  (-1.7292)**  (-1.7643)*** (-2.3559)****  (-3.1073)*****
*  Statistically  significant  at  8X  level.
**  Statistically  significant  at  10X  level.
**  Statistically  significant  at  9X  Level.
**  Statistically  significant  at  3K Level.
*****  StatisticalLy  significant  at  0.5X  level.
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Table II: Modified Control-Group Estimates of the CFA Zone Participation
(w.r.t.  SSA and LIDC, 1986-89 Versus 1982-85)
.............................................................................................................................  . ......  .........  . ...........................................................................  _
Dependent  Variables
Change  in  Change  in  Change  In  Change  in  Change
GDP  Growth  Exports  as  GDI as %  GDS  as %  In In-
Rate  % of GDP  of GDP  of GDP  flation
d,)  (d,-hat)  (d,-hat)  (d, hat)  Idj)
.................................................................................................................................................  .......................................................... 
Rearassors
Constant  4.8476  8.8805  9.2639  8.5001  293.1522
(1.4484)  (1.6099)  (2.0000)  (2.7113)  (1.1281)
GDP,,  -0.8022  0.0341  0.2465  . -18.3223
(-6.6795)  (0.1375)  (1.0004)  ..  (-1.0794)
Exp/GDP,.,  ..  0.0399  ..  0.1131  -2.9544
(0.4319)  0.  (1.6853)  (-0.9786)
GDI/GDP,,  0.0371  ..  -0.2682  ..  5.0934
(0.8759)  ..  (-3.8337)  ..  (0.9612)
GDS/GDP,.  . 0.1574  -0.1208  -0.4420
(2.4550)  (-2.4303)  (-4.5916)
DF/GDP,.,  0.0423  0.2954  0.2969  0.6091
(0.4099)  (1.3120)  (2.1804)  (2.6239)
Inflation,,  0.0050  0.0047  -0.0002  -0.0003  -1.0001
(3.1419)  (1.2361)  (-0.1762)  (-0.3281)  (-62.44)
VARRER,.,  0.0475  ..  -0.0268  -0.0053
(1.5798)  ..  (-1.1494)  (-0.1369)
RER,.,  -0.0050  0.0053  ..  -0.0062  -0.2586
(-0.3060)  (0.1763)  ..  (-0.2807)  (-0.6521)
CHGDCr,.,  -0.0508  -0.0236  ..  ..
(-3.4364)  (-0.6745)
TOT,.,  -0.0102  -0.0941  -0.0108  . -2.3496
(-0.2742)  (-1.5440)  (-0.2183)  ..  (-1.0515)
ChgRes,.,  0.0093  0.4945  -0.2382  0.5328  -1.7567
(0.1537)  (4.2423)  (-2.5494)  (3.3798)  (-0.9221)
ChgDOO,.1  0.0132  ..  0.0311  0.0334
(1.1297)  ..  (1.6437)  (1.5132)
Int'l  Shock  0.0945  -0.0830  0.0744  ..  1.4616
(1.8157)  (-0.9683)  (1.0658)  ..  (0.9822)
Extl  Shock  0.1976  ..  0.5332  0.4267  0.9130
(3.1561)  ..  (4.5262)  (3.0859)  (0.3005)
Dumny  -0.0215  -0.0699  -0.0267  -0.0629  -0.3565
(-2.1781)*  (-2.8209)**  (-1.6873)***  (-3.0950)****  (-1.4328)*****
*  Statistically  significant  at  3% level.
**  Statistically  significant  at  0.7% Level.
***  Statistically  significant  at  10%  level.
****  Statistically  significant  at  0.4% level.
*****  Statistically  significant  at  0.16% level.41
ANNEX  III  Table  III
Table III: Modified Control-Group Estimates  of the CFA Zone Participation
(w.r.t.  SSA. 1982-89 Versus 1973-81)
.................................................................................................................................................. w
Dependent Variables
Chang  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change
GDP  Growth  Exports as  GODI  as  GDS  as  In In-
Rate  % of GDP  of GDP  of GDP  flatban
(di)  Id  -hat)  (d,-hatl  Id,-hat)  (d 1 )
..................................................................................................................................................  ............................................................ 
Regressor
Constant  -13.1860  -32.3670  -4.1905  -55.6159
(-2.5571)  (1.27439)  (-0.3306)  (-2.3156)
GDP,.*  -0.7312  ..  0.6431  1.2745
(-3.9992)  ..  (1.4583)  (1.8766)
Exp/GDP,.,  ..  -0.2877  -0.0479  0.0382  0.6099
(-1.3447)  (-0.6287)  (0.4598)  (1.1875)
GD  I  /GDP,,  0.1534  . . -0.4394  ..  0.5817
(2.8591)  ..  (-3.6383)  ..  (1.9148)
GDS/GDP,.,  -0.1122  ..  ..  -0.3130  -1.2544
(-3.7242)  ..  ..  (-3.3489)  (-2.8385)
OF/GDPt.,  ..  . 0.2559  .
(0.8618)
InflatIorn.,  0.2212  0.2642  0.2490  0.8076  1.2629
(2.6354)  (0.6971)  (1.2684)  (3.0785)  (2.2438)
VARRER,.,  -0.1132  -0.1308  -0.1568  -0.4108  -1.1506
(-1.6524)  (-0.3807)  (-0.9698)  (-1.9776)  (-2.1596)
RERt.,  0.1161  0.1753  ..  0.4609  0.5267
(2.3671)  (0.8360)  ..  (1.9035)  (1.4671)
CHGDCr,.,  ..  ..  ..  -0.0532  0.5457
(-0.7121)  (1.8020)
TOT,,  ..  0.1101  0.0696  ..  -0.8172
(0.5767)  (0.7457)  ..  (-2.2939)
ChgRes,.,  -0.1308  0.1793  -0.2342  ..  -2.1898
(-2.4937)  (0.7476)  (-1.3112)  ..  (-2.7855)
ChgOD,.  ..  0.0341  ..  ..  0.1842
(0.4534)  ..  ..  C1.3134)
Int't  Shock  ..  -0.1693  -0.1927  -0.1082  -0.7305
(-1.1345)  (-1.3611)  (-0.5779)  (-2.0149)
Ext'l  Shock  0.1628  -0.1828  0.6447  0.8837
(2.0117)  (-0.2529)  (1.9142)  (2.2898)
Duwy  0.0100  0.0963  0.0699  0.1179  -0.0824
(1.3364)*  (2.2487)**  (2.0965)***  (2.9699)****  (-1.3094)*****
*  Statistically  significant  at  20X level.
*  Statistically  significant  at  4X level.
**  Statistically  significant  at  5X level.
**  Statistically  significant  at  0.8X  level.
*****  Statisticalty  significant  at  0.21X  levet.42
ANNEX III  TABLE IV
Table VI: Modified Control-Group Estimates  of the CFA Zone Participation
(w.r.t.  SSA and LIDC, 1982-89 Versus 1973-81)
..................................................................................................................................................  .................................................................... 
Dependent Variables
Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change
GDP Growth  Exports as  GDI as %  GDS as %  in In-
Rate  % of  GDP  of GDP  of GDP  flatlon
(d,j  (d,-hat)  (d,-hat)  (d,-hat)  (dj)
...............................................................................................................................................
Rearessors
Constant  1.6632  -11.3763  ..  -15.2179  963.6499
01.2122)  (-0.7729)  ..  (-2.1835)  (2.3765)
GDP,.,  -0.8013  -0.2621  ..  0.4944  -7.5516
(-6.0691)  (-0.5260)  ..  (1.2023)  (-0.5258)
Exp/GDP,.,  -0.0341  -0.3495  -0.0933  0.0225  0.8856
(-0.9989)  (-2.2286)  (-1.8074)  (0.3414)  (0.3207)
GCI/GDPt.,  0.1039  ..  0.3023  ..  -5.1830
(2.3469)  ..  (-3.9323)  ..  (-1.2480)
GDS/GDP,.,  -0.0603  0.0807  ..  -0.2003
(-1.6399)  (0.7563)  ..  (-2.5393)  ..
DF/GDP,.,  -0.1349  0.4444  ..  0.0706  7.4114
(-1.7084)  (0.1511)  ..  (0.3075)  (0.7441)
InfLation,.,  -0.0311  G.2609  0.0717  0.3282  -1.0829
(-0.6711)  (1.4204)  (1.1859)  (2.6505)  (-0.2929)
VARRER,.,  0.0130  -0.2463  -0.0418  -0.2515
(0.4083)  (-1.5993)  (-0.6844)  (-2.9559)  ..
RER,,  ..  0.1082  0.0699  0.1134  -1.4199
(1.8532)  (3.9676)  (2.0525)  (-0.6252)
CHGDCr,.,  0.0134  ..  ..  0.0220  8.6662
(0.7760)  . ..  (0.3328)  (3.2293)
TOT,.  ..  0.0157  ..  ..  -7.8573
..  -(0.1650)  ..  ..  (-3.2959)
ChgRes 1 .,  ..  ..  -0.2032  . .
(-1.5624)  .
ChgDODO.,  -0.0262  0.0859  -0.0324  -0.0039  0.8642
(-1.7304)  (1.3175)  (-1.0133)  (-0.0774)  (0.5285)
Int'l  Shock  0.0752  0.0176  0.1325  0.0972  2.1311
(2.2632)  (0.1782)  (1.9855)  (0.9690)  (0.6274)
Ext'l Shock  ..  -0.2656  0.3582  0.5542  -8.1491
(-1.0440)  (2.5141)  (2.5320)  (-0.9403)
Dummy  -0.0060  0.0449  0.0274  0.0595  -1.4801
(0.8809)*  (1.8053)**  (1.3941)***  (2.0399)**** (-1.7557)***b
*  Statistically  significant  at 38% leveL.
**  StatisticaLly  significant  at 8% level.
*  Statistically  significant  at 17% Level.
****  StatisticalLy  significant  at 4X level.
****  StatisticalLy  significant  at  9% Level.43
Data sources and Definitions
All data are from  Andrex and BESD databases  of the  World Sank and IMF.  The
base year for  all the constant price series is 1980. The Real  Effective Exchange
Rate  (RER) is based  on the  IMF definition.  It  is defined as the  nominal
effective exchange rate (trade  weighted) multiplied by the ratio of the CPI of
the country to the WPI of the trade partner country.  An increase in  the index,
therefore, means appreciation.  The RER series for the earlier years are from
the CECMG and CECTP of the World Bank.  The variability of the exchange rate is
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the RER  index over the mean.
The ratios of the performance indicators to  GDP in Tables 1 and 3 are in
constant prices.  Inflation is  defined as  the percentage chang'es  in  the CPI index
and  in the case of  missing  years  it is proxied by  either WPI  or the GDP
deflators.
The  definitions of the  external and internal  shocks  are presented in  Tables
3 of the main text.  The internal shock is proxied by the percentage changes in
the index  of food  production from  one period to the other.  As mentioned in notes
to  Table 3,  the interest rate shock is  based on the actual  debt service  payments
and  as such does not include arrears in interest payments.
The  public  finance  data  are  from GFS,  IMF. The  gaps  are  filled  with  data
provided by CECMG which were also used in the RAL II  Report.  The series pertain
to  the consolidated Central  Government  data exclusive  of  public enterprise losses
and  profits.
The  estimation results are  based on  1980 constant  prices.  The
nomenclatures  are  defined  as follows:
GDP  Gross  Domestic  Product  (in  1980  constant  prices,  local
Currency)
GDI  Gross Domestic Investment  (in 1980 constant prices,
local  currency)44
GDS  Gross  Domestic  Savings  (in  1980  constant  prices,  local
currency)
Deficit  (Def)  Government  deficit  (in  current  prices,  local
currency)
INFL  Inflation  (percentage  change  in the  CPI)
RER  Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate
VARRER  Variability  of  the REER
TOT  Terms  of Trade  index  in 1980  prices
ChgD  Change  in debt  outstanding  and  disbursed
ChgRes  Change  in  resource  balance  (Exports  GNFS  - Imports
GNFS)
Ext'l  Shock  External  Shock  (combined  interest  rate  and  TOT  shocks)
Int'l  Shock  Intarnal  Shock  (percentage  Change  in  food  production
index)
DSAL  Dummy  variables  for countries  having  SAL  programs
with  the  World  Bank
(-1)  Pertains to the previous period45
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